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## Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000400060007-6

10 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Walter Elder

Executive Secretary, NFIB

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FROM:

Chairman, COMIREX

SUBJECT:

Comments on Proposed DCID 1/XX, "Uniform Procedures for Administrative Handling and Accountability of Sensitive

Compartmented Information (SCI)"

REFERENCE:

NFIB-D-9.3/18, 21 December 1977

- 1. There are three parts of the draft DCID that we believe could or would create problems with reference to TK matters, specifically:
  - a. The language of paragraph 3 of the covering memorandum, which bears the signature of the DCI, could be wrongly interpreted that the D/NRO, as an "operational program director," would now have the authority to make policy on release to foreign governments. Since that is not the intention, recommend that the paragraph be rephrased in the following manner:

"This directive is not intended to limit the authority and responsibilities of Executive Agent or other operational program directors, or the SCI Control Officials designated by the DCI, for management of other aspects of their respective programs, such as basic operational direction, and policy guidance on security classifications and controls and dissemination to foreign governments."

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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b. Literal adherence to the provisions on pages 11-13 that deal with the "Minimum Standards for Control of SCI Released to Contractors or Consultants" might be construed as in conflict with key aspects of the 28 December 1977 COMIREX Memorandum D-2.10/2, which outlines the guidelines on Contractor Holdings of TALENT-KEYHOLE Imagery. To resolve the conflicts between the policy guidance in the two documents suggest the following two changes to the proposed DCID:

(1) Security Regulation, page 11, para 3. Change as follows:

"The sponsoring agency ensures that such releases are in conformity with the contractor policy directives formulated for the specific types of SCI involved."

(2) Security Regulation, page 13. Change as follows:

"When specifically required by the contractor for another contract by another sponsoring agency-provided that the requisite security safeguards and accountability procedures specified by this directive continue to be maintained by the contractor or consultant, and provided that the second sponsoring agency assumes monitoring responsibility for the SCI materials to be retained."

2. A final point about timing the issuance of this proposed DCID. I strongly recommend deferral of approval or other further consideration of this proposed DCID at the present time for the following reason. It would reflect poor management to issue this DCID with its five references to Executive Order 11652, including the concept of a General Declassification Schedule, and then find within the next month or two the President has approved the currently proposed Executive Order on "National Security Information," which revokes Executive Order 11652, and promulgates a declassification approach different from the current General Declassification Schedule. Since this proposed Executive Order has already reached the final draft stage, with comments required no later than January 20, a delay in issuing the proposed DCID is

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definitely in order. Once the Executive Order is approved, the proposed DCID should be appropriately modified so as to conform with its provisions, and then re-submitted to the DCI and NFIB for consideration.

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